

A question of *negatively biased* commitment: evidence from Korean evidential Long Negation Polar Questions

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Goals of this talk:

- (1) a. By adding an evidential dimension, I account for the source of **negative bias** in positively biased polar questions;
b. I show that, even for epistemically (and positively) biased polar questions, **contextual evidence** matters, and;
c. Semantics of **conjectural questions** is also derived *true-to-form*.

Biased Polar Questions (PQs) and evidentiality both touch on the issue of how commitments on unresolved issues are made via sourcehood, but few studies make the connection between the two but see (but see Frana and Rawlins 2025). Using commitment-based formal pragmatic model à la Gunlogson (2008), we will see that interpretations of question bias are tightly linked to different **sentential forces**.

1 Prelude: bias ambiguity in Korean PQs

Let us take the case study of evidential marking in Korean biased PQs.

- Two negation morphemes in Korean: **Short-form negation** *an-* and **Long-form negation** (LN) *anh-*;
 - We focus on the latter to form biased PQs in Korean. Some established facts about LN in PQ contexts:
- (2) a. Long Negation PQs (LN-PQs) are ambiguous in terms of bias interpretation; it can be interpreted as conveying either *p-* or $\neg p$ - bias (Kim, Kim, and Nam 2024);
b. LN is called ‘long’ because of its biclausal structure (not just due to the complexity of the morpheme); *anh-* negates a whole CP headed by *-ci*, rendering two tense sites;

- c. Marking the embedded tense forces a positive bias in LN-PQs (Park 2020);
- d. In other words, a negative bias reading of LN-PQs is expected when it is not embedded tense-marked (only when it’s just matrix tense-marked).

I label the two tense-marked LN-PQs as the following (let *p* be ‘John came to the party’ across most of the examples in this handout):

(3) a. Matrix (tense) LN-PQ

John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-[ass]-ni?
John-NOM party-to come-COMP NEG.do-PST-Q
‘Didn’t John come to the party?’ (*p*-biased)
or ‘John did not come to the party?’ ($\neg p$ -biased)

b. Embedded (tense) LN-PQ

John-i phathi-ey o-[ass]-ci anh-ni?
John-NOM party-to come-PST-COMP NEG.do-Q
‘Didn’t John come to the party?’ (*p*-biased)

When we add the direct evidential tense *-te*¹ into the picture, an unexpected $\neg$ -reading is forced, and I dub this Evidential LN-PQ, (4), (the evidential² meaning is represented as being Not-At-Issue, NAI). Compare (3a) with (4):

(4) Evidential LN-PQ (+ Matrix tense)

John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-ass-[te]-ni?
John-NOM party-to come-COMP NEG.do-PST-TE-Q
‘John did not come to the party?’ ($\neg p$ -biased)
NAI: ‘Did you perceive John’s absence at the party?’

What I mean by (speaker) bias:

¹ I am not trying to argue about the syntactic category of the direct evidential marker *-te*. Readers are referred to Chung (2007) and Lee (2013) for the debate on whether *-te* is tense or modal, and how its temporal contribution should be represented.

² For brevity, I will gloss the direct evidential *-te* simply as TE.

(5) **Speaker bias** (cf. Domaneschi, Romero, and Braun 2017)

The speaker’s inclination towards one of the two answers to a polar question due to their previous belief about subject matter, before they may update their epistemic state at the moment of utterance (on the basis of new contextual evidence).

I use polar responses as a test for the direction of speaker bias:

(6) Diagnostics of the direction of speaker bias

(polar response particle + propositional answer)

a. Ung, o-ass-e.

yes come-PST-DEC

[Match-positive] ‘yes, he came.’ (yes, p)

Matrix (3a): ✓, Embedded (3b): ✓, Evidential (4): ??

b. Ung, o-ci anh-ass-e.

yes come-COMP NEG.do-PST-DEC

[Mismatch-negative] ‘yes, he didn’t come.’ (yes, $\neg p$)

Matrix (3a): ✓, Embedded (3b): ??, Evidential (4): ✓

c. Ani, o-ass-e.

no come-PST-DEC

[Mismatch-positive] ‘no, he came.’ (no, p)

Matrix (3a): ✓, Embedded (3b): ??, Evidential (4): ✓

d. Ani, o-ci anh-ass-e.

no come-COMP NEG.do-PST-DEC

[Match-negative] ‘no, he didn’t come.’ (no, $\neg p$)

Matrix (3a): ✓, Embedded (3b): ✓, Evidential (4): ??

Response patterns to LN-PQs can be characterized as either polarity-matching (yes, p / no, $\neg p$) and polarity-reversing (yes, $\neg p$ / no p):

	Polarity-matching	Polarity-reversing
Matrix LN-PQ, (3a)	✓	✓
Embedded LN-PQ, (3b)	✓	??
Evidential LN-PQ, (4)	??	✓

Table 1: Response patterns to LN-PQs

This pattern leads us to wonder about two things:

Q1. Why is the direction of speaker bias disambiguated in Embedded and Evidential LN-PQs (unlike Matrix LN-PQs)?;

Q2. Why are Evidential LN-PQs polarity-reversing (how come they are construed as negatively biased)?

Considering the known positive bias in many negative PQs (e.g. English High Negation PQs), Q2 is cross-linguistically more puzzling. I focus on answering Q2 in this talk with the following roadmap:

✓ Prelude

☞ Evidential LN-PQs and Declarative Questions

☞ Speaker bias in commitment terms (an informal account)

☞ Remarks on Conjectural Questions

2 Evidential LN-PQs and Declarative Questions

Let us start by looking at a token of an Evidential LN-PQ with context from a spoken corpus (from the 2023 dialogue corpus constructed by the National Institute of Korean Language):

(7) **Ceiling fan example**

A couple is discussing about the recent remodeling of their apartment. Addressee says ‘there’s not much that is upgraded in our apartment.’ Speaker reacts to this:

Silingpayn koaycanh-ci anh-te-na? (... I thought it was nice)

ceiling.fan be.fine-COMP NEG.do-TE-Q *afterthought*

‘The ceiling fan isn’t nice?’

NAI: ‘Your observation is that the (changed) ceiling fan isn’t nice?’

Two points to note from (7):

- (8) i. The negative reaction from the speaker is a direct response to the *negative remark* from the addressee (and the NAI meaning is responding to that).
- ii. As the afterthought-like continuation hints at, the speaker is actually *positively biased* regarding the matter, despite the addressee’s rather lukewarm attitude.

Here I will only focus on the former³.

³ The latter point, i.e. deriving the speaker’s positive bias, has been extensively studied (see e.g. Goodhue 2022; Romero and Han 2004) and I have no further point to make here.

2.1 Negative bias comes from negative contextual evidence

The first observation, (8i), is in fact not an exceptional case. An experimental study also corroborates the better acceptability of $\neg p$ -bias in contexts loaded with negative contextual evidence (Kim et al. 2024)⁴:




Figure 1: Acceptability of Matrix LN-PQs (right, “LFN”) in three types of contextual evidence




Figure 2: Acceptability of Matrix LN-PQs for three context types

(9) Negative readings of Matrix LN-PQs in Kim et al. (2024)

- i. ‘No’ responses are polarity-matching: higher acceptability for negative propositional answers than positive ones;

⁴ Their stimuli were Matrix LN-PQs (and Short Negation PQs), hence their lack of disambiguation of speaker bias; The response patterns took the forms in (6).

⁵ 45 years ago here at CLS!

- ii. Surprisingly, in neutral and negative contextual evidence conditions, polarity-reversing ‘yes’ responses (‘yes, $\neg p$ ’) are highly acceptable (4.67, 4.83), with a marginal difference to ‘no, $\neg p$ ’ responses (4.94, 4.52);
- iii. Furthermore, in negative contextual evidence condition, ‘yes’ responses seem to be more acceptable as a negative (4.83) rather than a positive propositional answer (4.19).

Then, we can think that the source of polarity-reversing character of polar answers to an Evidential LN-PQ (and of its $\neg p$ -bias in general) is the **negative contextual evidence**.

- The evidential is a grammaticalized reflex of this discourse component, as the NAI meaning in (7) illustrates;
- Matrix LN-PQs without evidential marking does this tacitly.

2.2 Inner Negation PQs (Ladd 1981)

Spoiler: Even for languages without evidential morphemes, negative contextual evidence does affect the form and meaning of PQs.

- Ladd (1981)⁵ famously subcategorized English High Negation PQs into **Outer Negation** and **Inner Negation PQs** (INPQs).
- Romero and Han (2004) argue that only the latter (and any biased PQ in contradictory scenarios) composes negation into the preajcent as an instance of syntactic disambiguation. NPI licensing is used as a test for the ‘inner-ness’ of negation:

(10) Ladd’s INNER NEGATION PQ (adapted)

A: There’s not really any place to go in Hyde Park for dining.

B: Oh, really, isn’t there a(ny) vegetarian restaurant around here?

(Compare this to:)

(11) Ladd’s OUTER NEGATION PQ (adapted)

A: Should we go out and get something to eat?

B: Yeah, isn’t there {a/#any} vegetarian restaurant around here?

There is a debate on whether INPQ is indeed a distinct construction from Outer Negation PQ (Romero 2024, for an overview). Here, I point

out the similarity of Inner (and not Outer) Negation PQs to other forms of biased PQs⁶. INPQs can be replaced by negative **declarative questions** (DecQs, a.k.a. Rising Declaratives; Gunlogson 2008)⁷ as in (12B'') or **Low Negation Questions** (cf. Kramer and Rawlins 2009) as in (12B'''):

- (12) A: : There's not really any place to go in Hyde Park for dining.
 B': Oh, really, isn't there any vegetarian restaurant around here?
 B'': Oh, really, there's no vegetarian restaurant around here?
 B''': Oh, really, is there no vegetarian restaurant around here?

Crucially, this parallelism does not hold for Outer Negation counterparts. Lack of negative contextual evidence that conflicts with positive speaker bias is the reason why.

We have seen that certain speaker-biased constructions (Evidential LN-PQs in Korean and Inner Negation PQs in English) require negative contextual evidence as part of their core meaning. These are found in **epistemic conflict** scenarios, where the speaker's belief and the addressee's statement are at odds.

2.3 What counts as evidence in questions

- So far, contextual evidence for licensing biased PQs came from the immediately preceding utterance of the addressee;
- However, not every biased utterance can take words from the addressee. To see what counts as evidence in questions, let us turn our attention back to Korean LN-PQs:

When Q-morpheme (such as *-ni* or *-nya*) is replaced with a plain declarative morpheme (*-e*) with a rising intonation (↑), the bias meanings observed in (3) are preserved. In other words, canonical (= Q-marked) LN-PQs and declarative LN-PQs (or negative RDs) are functionally similar just as Inner Negation PQ, (12B') and negative RD, (12B'') are.

(13) Non-evidential negative declaratives

- a. John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-ass-e↑.
 John-NOM party-at come-COMP NEG.do-PST-DEC

'John didn't come to the party.'

- b. John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-ass-e↑.
 John-NOM party-at come-COMP NEG.do-PST-DEC↑
 'Didn't John come to the party?' or 'John did not come to the party?'

However, when the equivalent change is applied to Evidential LN-PQs (with *-te*-compatible declarative morpheme, *-la*), this parallelism breaks. (14b) no longer conveys the typical DecQ meaning (losing its typical question flavor) and functions rather as a **Conjectural Question**.

(14) Evidential negative declaratives

- a. John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-ass-te-la.
 John-NOM party-at come-COMP NEG.do-PST-TE-DEC
 'John didn't come to the party.'
 NAI: 'I perceived it (= John's absence at the party).'
- b. ??John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-ass-te-la↑.
 John-NOM party-at come-COMP NEG.do-PST-TE-DEC↑
 'John did not come to the party.'
 NAI: 'I think I perceived it (= John's absence at the party)?'

I dub this oddity captured in (14b) **Evidential-DecQ puzzle**. This puzzle bears the following features:

- (15) i. The Origo (the evidence holder) does not shift to the addressee;
 ii. No conceivable context could retrieve the other biased PQs' meaning (i.e. the speaker is positively biased and asks the addressee to clarify their negative commitment);
 iii. The negative contextual evidence coming from the addressee in the immediately preceding discourse renders an even more odd discourse;
 iv. Contrary to other typical Evidential LN-PQs, it can be conjectural discourse starters (similarly to observations of German verb-final *wohl* questions in Eckardt 2020);
 v. As the NAI paraphrase suggests, the evidential proposition has a weakened meaning, adding the conjectural flavor to it.

⁶ Lee (2025) shows a similar intuition in this regard.

⁷ In fact, INPQs are sometimes (mis)translated to negative RDs. See e.g. Armstrong (2017) for Puerto Rican Spanish. I think this kind of confusion is telling.

English, a language lacking morphological evidentials, replicates this puzzle with perspectival adverbs such as *apparently*. Let q be ‘There is no vegetarian restaurant nearby’:

(16) **Evidential DecQ in English**

Imagine the speaker previously checked Google Maps for a vegetarian restaurant in Hyde Park, and now talks to a Chicago local.

(Hey,) There’s apparently no vegetarian restaurant around here?

(17) 4 out of 5 features in (15) are preserved⁸:

- i. The evidence comes from the speaker’s previous information gain (and not from the addressee);
- ii. The speaker is not biased towards q , nor are they requiring confirmation of $\neg q$ from the addressee;
- iii. (It CAN be a follow up to 12A);
- iv. It can head a discourse (uttered out-of-the-blue or change of topics) as illustrated with the ‘Hey’-diagnostics;
- v. Even with the previous acquisition of some evidence for q , the speaker is not fully committed to q .

In Bhadra (2020), core intuitions about this puzzle are shared: that the Origo does not shift, (i), and evidential questions can only be speaker-biased towards the content proposition (containing negation), (ii). What she misses is how those meanings are connected to the sentential force. Next section explores that possibility.

- ✓ Prelude
- ✓ Evidential LN-PQs and Declarative Questions
- ☞ Speaker bias in commitment terms (an informal account)
- ☞ Remarks on Conjectural Questions

3 Speaker bias in commitment terms (an informal account)

Recall the bias ambiguity of Matrix LN-PQs, repeated here:

- (18) John-i phathi-ey o-ci anh-[ass]-ni?
 John-NOM party-to come-COMP NEG.do-PST-Q
 ‘Didn’t John come to the party?’ ($\approx$ High Negation PQ)
 or ‘John did not come to the party?’ ($\approx$ Negative DecQ)

As the two paraphrases in (18) hint at, my arguments on the origin of speaker bias are based on different sentential forces and the subsequent commitments (§3.1). Although Korean lacks transparent morphosyntactic marking of the relevant formal features, the Evidential-DecQ puzzle presented above provides compelling evidence (§3.2).

3.1 Proposal: bias is true-to-form

I argue the following⁹:

- Typical p -biased LN-PQs (such as Embedded LN-PQs in 3b) are derived from polar interrogatives.
- Evidential LN-PQs, as well as any $\neg p$ -biased LN-PQs are, in fact, negative DecQs.

These formal differences are captured in terms of commitments¹⁰ and their sources, taking models devised in Gunlogson (2008); Malamud and Stephenson (2015); Bhadra (2020).

Canonical LN-PQs

- (19) Updating biased polar interrogatives
- i. The speaker of a canonical (=derived from the interrogative sentence form) PQ raises an issue of denotation $\{p\}$ (cf. Biezma and Rawlins 2012) and can arrive at a joint commitment only through the addressee’s answer;
 - ii. The speaker is not adding anything to their discourse commitment set ($DC_{Spk}' = DC_{Spk}$);

⁸ I speculate that the difference from the Korean Evidential-RD puzzle in (14b) originates from the type of evidentiality: Unlike the Korean direct evidential *-te-*, English *apparently* conveys an inferential flavor, leaving room to accommodate other interlocutors’ previous remarks.

⁹ I was originally working with the Table model (Farkas and Bruce 2010), but here I use commitment and sources pre-theoretical concepts, captured without such model.

¹⁰ By COMMITMENT, I follow Stalnaker (2002) by assuming it to mean publicly *accepted* propositional attitudes, not necessarily believed to be true.

- iii. but marks their bias by updating the addressee's prospective commitment set with the prejacent p ($DC_{Adr}^* = DC_{Adr} \cap \{p\}$).

In Embedded LN-PQs, tense is valued inside the embedded CP (underneath the long negation *anh-*) and completes the LF for propositional anaphora, hence p -bias is predicted. A piece of evidence that $\{p\}$ is indeed getting updated comes from **insubordination**. An LN-PQ utterance that omitted the long negation cluster, *anh-ni*, can still convey the same p -biased meaning¹¹ (see the paraphrase):

- (20) John-i phathi-ey o-[ass]-ci? (anh-ni)
 John-NOM party-to come-PST-COMP (NEG.do-Q)
 'Didn't John come to the party?' (still p -biased)

Negative DecQs

- (21) Per [Gunlogson \(2008\)](#), the speaker of DecQs make commitments (by virtue of the declarative form) that are *contingent* on the addressee's ratification:
- i. this brings about the questionhood to the utterance;
 - ii. the contingent commitment of the speaker is captured by the addressee's relative authority over the content proposition (contingency in terms of hierarchy of $DC_{Adr}^* > DC_{Spk}^*$, that is, only when DC_{Adr}^* updates DC_{Adr} , then DC_{Spk}^* can update DC_{Spk});
 - iii. (from the Source Principle,) holding an epistemic authority over p means being the **SOLE SOURCE** for the commitment p .
- (22) **Source Principle** ([Gunlogson 2008](#)): Commitments have sources. ('Being a source for ϕ ' = the agent is committed to ϕ and their commitment does not depend on another agent's testimony that ϕ .)

Evidential LN-PQs are of this sort. I have shown in §2.1 and §2.3 that typical Evidential LN-PQs (except for the Evidential-DecQ puzzle, which I will come back to in §3.2) are sensitive to a tentative commitment coming from the context and, in many cases, from the addressee's preceding utterance. The speaker is reacting to this *potential* commitment by posing it as a question. In [Gunlogson's](#) terms, the speaker identifies the addressee

as the **SOURCE** of the $\neg p$ -commitment.

One disclaimer: While Korean morphosyntax does not transparently show this form, I make a small claim that Q-morphemes in Korean (such as *-ni*, *-nya*) are NOT interrogative sentence markers. The fact that it is preceded (for a head-final language) by most evidential markers (except for reportatives) indirectly shows that Q-morphemes are not responsible for providing any question semantics. I deem it more as a pragmatic marker of inquisitiveness that interacts with context (and entities in the context).

3.2 Application on Evidential LN-PQs

Now I move on to explaining the Evidential-DecQ puzzle. Given the *true-to-form*-style account of Evidential LN-PQs in §3.1, it looks even more puzzling. Why can't evidential questions make tentative commitments?

The key to the puzzle should be, again, true-to-form. In fact, this puzzle from Korean is one rare case where morphology supports this account. Also, a rare interaction between evidentiality and sourcehood is observed.

Canonical evidential questions (non-declarative Evidential LN-PQs)

Let us first consider the non-declarative Evidential LN-PQs, (4):

- (23) i. Assuming the default Origo of evidentials to be the speaker, there is a systematic clash of **independent sourcehood** (=who makes an independent commitment) in evidential PQs.
- ii. How come? For a single utterance, it is epistemologically awkward to have multiple independent sources. However, the evidential directs at the speaker and the Q-morpheme directs at the addressee as the independent source.
- iii. This is where cross-linguistically well-attested **INTERROGATIVE FLIP**¹² (IF) resolves this epistemic clash: In inquisitive speech acts, it flips the EVIDENTIAL REQUIREMENT (see [Korotkova 2020](#)) from the speaker to the addressee.

¹¹I do not analyze this as a case of TAG QUESTIONS because the long negation cluster cannot reverse polarity and preserves the negative form when the prejacent is already negative (marked by short negation). English tag questions, on the other hand, do flip the polarity in the tag: *John didn't come to the party, did he?*

¹²Note that it's the **questionhood/inquisitiveness**, not the interrogative (sentential) form that brings about this discourse effect. There is nothing in the interrogative form that encodes an interlocutor parameter such as the addressee.

- iv. This discourse-level accommodation has to be implemented for the regular Evidential LN-PQs due to the $\boxed{-te-Q}$ complex: *-te* is structurally in a lower position than Q, hence the anchor in Q (=the addressee) alters the anchor in *-te* (=the speaker). In other words, the $\boxed{-te-Q}$ form derives the inevitable IF effect.
- v. This leads to the pragmatic effect of contextual evidence sensitivity in evidential questions (cf. §2.1), rendering $\neg p$ -bias.

Puzzling evidential questions (declarative Evidential LN-PQs)

Now let us consider the declarative Evidential LN-PQs, (14b). The $\boxed{-te-DEC\uparrow}$ sentence-final complex holds the key:

- (24) i. $\boxed{-te-DEC\uparrow}$ is decomposed into $\boxed{-te-DEC}$ and $\boxed{\uparrow}$.
- a. Updating $\boxed{-te-DEC}$ is similar to a plain evidential assertion update. Following Korotkova (2020), the LF is the one where evidential (EV) out-scopes the speech act operator: $EV(\text{Assert}(p))$. Due to evidentiality, this declarative not only updates DC_{Spk} but also ss_{Spk} ; **SOURCE SET** (ss): the set of *p*-worlds with the interlocutor as the source of that *p*-commitment) with *p*;
 - b. $\boxed{\uparrow}$ updates DC_{Spk}^* , signalling the speaker's own prospective commitment towards *p* (Bhadra's conceptualization of the bias operator)
 - ii. Updating DC_{Spk} and ss_{Spk} , on the one hand, and DC_{Spk}^* , on the other, is peculiar in at least two ways:
 - a. Lack of IF, hence lack of encoding the addressee's relative authority (no typical DecQ reading);
 - b. Pragmatic oddity of updating the present and prospective commitment sets with a single utterance.

In sum, lack of IF explains the Evidential-DecQ puzzle. The evidential component tries to update the speaker's present commitment set and the final rise ($\uparrow$) tries to defer that update (*don't update your own commitment just now*). According to the pragmatic principles (cooperative maxims for commitments) of Rudin (2022), evidential questions violate SINCERITY, quality-like maxim for commitments.

4 Remarks on conjectural questions

This pragmatic oddity (or a non-sincere commitment update) nevertheless does not result in infelicity of evidential questions across the board. As it was briefly mentioned in §2.3, evidential questions can be used as **Conjectural Questions** (CQs):

- (25) Verb-final *wohl* questions in German (Eckardt 2020, p.28)
- i. A: I haven't had any news about Peter in a long time.
 - ii. B: Me neither.
 - iii. A: Ob er wohl immer noch kubanische Zigarren mag?
whether he wohl still PRT Cuban cigars likes
'I wonder whether he still likes Cuban cigars'
- (26) Proposed LF for the verb-final *wohl* CQ by Eckardt (2020)
[ob [_{ForceP} wohl [_{SpecCP} - [_{C'} - [_{IP} ? er - immer noch kubanische Zigarren mag]]]]]

Eckardt (2020) summarizes the pragmatic features of CQs such as the German one in (25) as the following:

- (27) i. the speaker does not expect the addressee to know the answer.
ii. the speaker does not request an answer.
iii. the addressee can remain silent without violating the rules of discourse.
iv. the speaker invites the addressee to speculative discourse about the topic.

All these properties, I argue, can be explained in the commitment framework without resorting to construction-specific abstract operators. Following is my argument:

- (28) i. I take it for granted that German particle *wohl* is analyzed similarly to inferential evidentials. Hence, *wohl* questions are evidential questions;
- ii. I also take it for granted that *ob* (paraphrasable as 'whether') in *wohl* questions block T-to-C movement, taking responsibility to maintain the declarative syntax. Hence, verb-final *wohl* questions are DecQs;

- iii. By virtue of i and ii, it is yet another case of the Evidential-DecQ puzzle. Then, I equate *ob-whol* (head-initial) to *-te-DEC* (head-final) in that this morpheme pair updates DC_{Spk} and ss_{Spk} . The final $\uparrow$ invariably updates DC_{Spk}^* .

The lack of inquisitive flavor of German CQs, then, can be attributed to the fact that CQs are not updating any of the addressee's DCs.

Appendix

Some thoughts on the invitational flavor of CQs, (27iv), with a parametric difference between Korean and German:

- (29) a. CQs follow the logic of abductive reasoning (Winans 2016), which has the logical form of *inverse modus ponens*¹³;
- b. German CQs involve the inferential evidential *wohl*, which conveys the reasoned bias (CONSEQUENCE), which is subject to defeasible inference (further piece of evidence can cancel the bias);
- c. Korean CQs (evidential negative RDs) involve the perceptual evidential *-te-*, which conveys the gathered evidence (TRIGGER). Evidential negative DecQs like (14b) do not convey the bias itself, but signals the acquisition of circumstantial result, fulfilling the preconditions for abductive reasoning;
- d. Both types of CQs would end up with an invitational flavor for the addressee to take part in this abductive reasoning process.

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¹³(i) if q , then p ; (ii) p ; (iii) therefore, q . Following Winans (2016), I will call p CONSEQUENCE and q TRIGGER (the possible cause of the consequence).